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PUBLIC SERVICE OBLIGATIONS IN THE ELECTRICITY AND GAS SECTOR AND THE 
ISSUE OF STATE AIDS 
 
В статье рассмотрена концепция Public service obligations (PSO) с позиции европейского законодатель-
ства. Особое внимание уделено вопросу классификации PSO в энергетической и газовой отраслях. Сделан 
акцент на формах финансирования, законодательных и регулятивных функциях PSO как общественного 
инструмента в вопросах защиты прав потребителей и свободы бизнеса.  
Ключевые слова: public service obligations, бесперебойность поставок, директивы в энергетическом и 
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1. General remarks 
Public service obligations (PSO) are quite common issue in the utility sectors of many Member States, al-
though the concept itself and the importance of PSO to the national authorities and the industry vary significantly. 
In fact there is no European definition of public service obligations, what perhaps can justify differentiated ap-
proach to PSO among Member States.2 Secondary legislation, soft law and the case law of the ECJ is somehow un-
clear in this regard. It is used interchangeably the concepts of public service obligation, service of general economic 
interest and service of general interest. Therefore in reality it is difficult to come up with one clear definition of 
PSO’s which would apply to all sectors of the internal market. In general public services – most typically but not 
exclusively network services such as telecommunication, electricity, gas, transport and postal services – are ser-
vices of commercial character, which are considered essential to the general public. For this reason authorities3 im-
pose public services obligations upon certain undertakings to guarantee that such services are provided according to 
the conditions specified by the authorities. Moreover most PSOs are not justified in economic or business terms, 
since they are burden with losses. This means that under normal circumstances market would be very hesitant to 
provide them, or wouldn’t provide them at all. Therefore to ensure the availability of such services national/public 
authorities grant funding/compensation to the selected public service providers under certain conditions. This on the 
other hand raise the issue of compensation for PSOs vis-à-vis the EC State aid law, which aims to prevent distortion 
of competition by prohibiting State measures granting advantages to certain undertakings that have a negative effect 
on competition. Natural, thus, is to ask under what conditions EC State aid law is applicable to the State funding of 
                                               
2 Mangenot in his book Public Administrations and Services of General Economic interest: What kind of Europeanisation? also maintains that in 
the former centrally planed economies of some of the New Members, PSO’s are perceived as less important, than in the Old Members (with 
France being the greatest enthusiast and supporter). The existence of authoritarian regimes in the Central and Eastern Europe with domination of 
Soviet Union legal doctrine harmed the entire legal structure of the CEE states, where public service obligations were treated as an issue of ir-
relevant importance. It is only recently New States of the EU are recognizing the significance of the PSO for assuring benefits of the utility ser-
vices for the public good, thus inducing changes to their doctrines. 
3 The public authority entrusting the obligation can further be a national, regional or local. For more on this see Buendia Sierra, Jose Luis (1999). 
Exclusive rights and State Monopolies under EC Law – Article 86 (formerly Article 90) of the EC Treaty. Oxford University Press, p.284. 
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the undertakings entrusted with the public service obligations? However before getting to the core, some time needs 
to be devoted to the concept of service public in the electricity and gas sector. 
2. Electricity and gas public service obligations (The concept of public service obligations within elec-
tricity and gas markets  
In case of the electricity and gas markets the secondary legislation, and case law of the European Court of Jus-
tice laid fundaments for the common profile of PSO’s and conditions/principles to be followed in setting the PSO 
scope. Although in reality it is the Member States who decide what public service obligation should encompass. In 
other words the classification of public service obligations is left, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, to 
the Member States. However this is done under the control of the Community, responsible for ensuring that the im-
position of public service obligations does not affect the development of trade to such an extent contrary to the in-
terest of the Community. In fact it is the European Commission’s responsibility, under the supervision of the Court, 
to identify and classify the interest of the Community according to which the development of trade can be assessed.  
The main acts for the electricity and gas sectors which deal with the PSO’s are:4 Directive 2003/54/EC of the 
European Parliament and Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity repealing Direc-
tive 96/92/EC (so called Electricity Directive) and the Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and Coun-
cil of June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC 
(so called Gas Directive).  
The Electricity and Gas Directives in Articles 3 allow Member States to impose on their electricity and gas un-
dertakings public service obligations in the general economic interest. The scope of PSO’s should comply with the 
specific criteria and objectives and should be strictly regulated. Article 3 para. 2 constitute: 
Having full regard to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, in particular Article 86 thereof, Member States may 
impose on undertakings operating in the electricity (consequently gas) sector, in the general economic interest, 
public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of 
supplies, and environmental protection, including energy efficiency and climate protection. Such obligations shall 
be clearly defined, transparent, non discriminatory, verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for EU elec-
tricity (consequently gas) companies to national consumers. In relation to security of supply, energy effi-
ciency/demand side management and for the fulfillment of environmental goals, as referred to in this paragraph, 
Member States may introduce the implementation of long term planning, taking into account the possibility of third 
parties seeking access to the system. 
All Member States in general include in their internal energy policies concern to guarantee certain public ser-
vice objectives. These objectives have been grouped into three wide categories: universal service,5 security of sup-
ply and protection of the environment.6 The obligations imposed upon Member States (either on network operators 
or suppliers) within the first category - concept of universal service include: 
· the right to be connected to the power grid/gas pipelines, 
· the right to be supplied electricity, 
· the right to be supplied with high quality and appropriate quantity  
· the right to be supplied electricity at reasonable and affordable prices 
· the right to receive high standards of customer service  
Within the first category there is also obligation to take appropriate measures by the electricity and gas compa-
nies to protect final consumers, especially vulnerable customers and those living in remote or rural areas, including 
appropriate measures to help consumers to avoid disconnections.  
Public service obligations also relate to security, including security of supply, and environmental protection, 
including energy efficiency and climate protection. When dealing with the security of supply it should be noticed 
that this concept is understood in a different manner in electricity than in gas sector. In case of electricity, three as-
pects may be raised:7 
· System security in terms of safety of network infrastructure. It is actually for each Member State to take 
appropriate regulatory and monitoring measures, to the security standards, which might differ among countries. The 
“physical” security of network infrastructure is not or at least should not be affected by the creation of the internal 
market for energy. Although the creation of the Internal Energy Market raises question of congestion resulting from 
unscheduled electricity flows due to trade activities across electricity systems in Europe. This especially has a con-
siderable impact on the transit countries. For instance, on 14 July 1999 the Belgian TSO was faced with flows on its 
system exceeding those scheduled for this particular day. The TSO had to react immediately in order not to harm 
                                               
4 Additionally the notion of PSO’s and its importance for the Community at least in its psychological dimension has been recognized by the EC 
Treaty. Article 16 of the EC Treaty states: Without prejudice to Articles 73, 86 and 87, and given the place occupied by services of general eco-
nomic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Community and the Mem-
ber States, each within their respective powers and within the scope of application of this Treaty, shall take care that such services operate on the 
basis of principles and conditions which enable them to fulfill their missions. Unfortunately Article 16 so far has not played a significant role in 
neither the practice of the European Commission nor the Community Courts. In addition Article 16 establishes a principle, but doesn’t provide 
the Community with a specific means of action. Therefore is has rather abovementioned so called psychological dimension, showing that the EU 
is aware of  the importance of the PSO’s for the citizens thus a special position to PSOs in the EC Treat has been assigned. 
5 The concept of universal service is mainly considered for electricity rather than gas. 
6 For more on this see Commission Staff Working Paper on completing the energy internal market, pp. 27 – 41, SEC (2001) 438 final, 
12.03.2001. Available also at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/library/438.pdf 
7 DG TREN Note on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on the Internal Market in Electricity and Gas. Measures to secure Electricity Sup-
ply. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/legislation/doc/notes_for_implementation_2004/security_of_electricity_supply_en.pdf  
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the entire system. Due to lack of information sharing and unaware of where those flows came from, Belgian TSO 
was legitimately obliged to limit scheduled dispatch. In 2003 similarly due to lack of information exchange be-
tween Italy and Switzerland the flow of electricity was blocked and the congestion problems appeared, significantly 
harming the infrastructure. Unfortunately the lessons from the 2003 Italian blackout have not been followed pre-
cisely and on 4 November 2006 large pan-European blackout accrued again. These are only few examples of con-
gestion problems, which fortunately were taken care of right away, though some major damages were noticed. 
Nevertheless, in general when dealing with the electricity networks technical problems are unavoidable, and as such 
they have to be treated as priority for the sake of the overall system security. There is no doubt that the improve-
ment of the co-operation between European electricity TSOs, which should be publicly accountable for their ac-
tions, is a necessity. Additionally an intermediate step in dealing with congestions problems is Article 23 of the 
Electricity Directive, which permits Member States to take appropriate measures and if it is necessary to suspend 
market access (TPA) for a limited time; 
· Supply security in terms of guarantying the existence of adequate generation capacity. It is for Member 
States to specify in advance the criteria for authorization procedure for a new generation capacity. Authorization 
may relate to number of issues specified in the Electricity Directive such as the safety and security of the electricity 
system, installations and associated equipment, safety and security and the nature of the primary energy source8 – 
the body responsible for the authorization should be the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) or any equivalent 
not related to the generation, transmission, distribution, or supply of electricity; 
· Supply security in terms of the primary energy sources to generation (gas, coal, uranium, etc). The main 
concern in the EU at this stage in terms of primary energy sources to generation is an excessive dependence on gas 
as a primary fuel for electricity generation. The growing dependence might produce potential intimidation to the 
electricity system within Europe. Therefore if the Member State assumes that installed capacity on the basis of a 
given primary source (in this case gas) is exceptionally high, or is growing to rapidly, so it constitutes a threat to 
overall security of electricity supply it may on the base of Article 6 para. 2) g) of the Electricity Directive, refuse 
granting of authorization for the construction of generating capacity on its territory. However the first step to deal 
with the issue of growing dependence on gas should be monitoring conducted both at the Community and domestic 
level. Afterward if it is determined, that certain actions must be taken to limit generation growth from a particular 
primary source, the Directive gives Member States appropriate measures. 
As already mentioned the notion of security of supply is constructed differently in gas as in electricity sector. 
The reason for this seems to be very simple, whereas electricity can be generated in every country of the EU gas ex-
traction can not. Natural gas is a good which constitute a major part of export policies of certain countries and as 
such belongs to the global trend of demand and supply.9 Moreover increased EU dependence on the gas supplies 
mainly from Russia, raise the question of security of the EU in relation to the internal market for gas. Therefore it is 
significant to hoist two issues with regard to security of supply of natural gas:10 
· Short-term security of supply – This involves creation of safeguards measures as defined by the Article 26 
of the Gas Directive, against supply disruptions, which are necessary in the context of the internal gas market. 
Short-term security supply issue, thus, is a responsibility of each Member State, which needs to take all necessary 
regulatory measures to clearly define security objectives and assign and distribute responsibilities among market 
players in accordance to the defined security objectives. What is obvious, this shall be done without violating com-
petition rules on the internal market. 
· Long-term security of supply – As contrary to the short-term security of supply, it involves strategic and 
geopolitical concerns at the EU level, with regard to providing adequate diversification of supplies and investments 
to meet growing demand for gas especially vis-à-vis growing dependence on Russian gas supplies.  
Additionally Member States imposing public service obligations on gas undertakings in relation to security of 
supply may in accordance with Article 3 para. 2 of the gas Directive introduce the implementation of long-term 
planning, which however shall be non-discriminatory and shall take into account third parties seeking access to the 
system.  
Last but not least Article 3 of both Gas and Electricity Directives endow Member States with the possibility to 
introduce public service obligations which may inter alia relate to the environment protection. Consequently Mem-
ber States are taking measures to ensure high environmental standards in gas and electricity production and supply, 
which also involve application of competition rules, and particularly those concerning State aids. 
Articles 3 of the Directives also put forward the conditions/principles to be followed in setting the PSO’s 
scope. Public service obligations shall be clearly defined, transparent, non discriminatory, verifiable and shall guar-
antee equality of access for EU electricity companies to national consumers. Unfortunately Directives remain silent 
as to what clearly defined, transparent or non-discriminatory in fact is. Thus in order to deal with the shortcomings 
of the Articles 3, number of soft law instruments have been adopted. Additionally case law11 of the European Court 
                                               
8 Electricity Directive – Article 6 para. 2. 
9 Of course there are other issues which should or could be taken under consideration when discussing demand & supply for gas such as for in-
stance long term supply contracts or simply take-or-pay contracts. But this is issue for another discussion paper and as such it will not be cover 
in this paper. 
10For more on this see also: DG TREN Note on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on the Internal Market in Electricity and Gas. Security 
of Supply Provisions for Gas. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/legislation/doc/notes_for_implementation_2004/security_of_gas_supply_en.pdf  
11 Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 27/8/ 1994, Municipality of Almelo and others, Case C-393/92. 
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of Justice has been seeking to clarify the limitation of PSO’s. DG TREN Interpretation Note on Public Service Ob-
ligations,12 Green Paper on Service of General Interest – COM (2003) 270 final13 and White Paper on Services of 
General Interest – COM (2004) 374 final,14 describe in more detail among other things, what are the conditions to 
be followed when setting the public service obligations scope. Generally speaking by clearly defined it is under-
stood that: i) the PSO’s imposed on the Member States have to be related to the supply of the service of general 
economic interest in question, ii) they have to contribute directly to satisfying this general economic interest, iii) 
they have to be imposed in such way in order not to affect the development of trade to an extent contrary to the in-
terests of the Community. In order to be transparent, the Commission considers that the public service task must be 
assigned by way of an official public instrument that may take the form of a legislative or regulatory instrument or a 
contract or instruction. This instrument must specify: 1) the nature of the public service obligations, 2) the under-
taking and territory concerned, 3) the responsibility for determining the undertaking’s selling prices and the condi-
tions for reviewing such prices, 4) the nature of any exclusive or special rights assigned to the undertakings, 5) the 
amount of any compensation granted to the undertakings and any revision clauses, 6) the period covered by these 
obligations.15 In the view of the Commission, the only way to effectively guarantee non-discrimination provided for 
in Article 3 is to use a tender procedure to carry out the public services obligations. It is also obvious that such call 
for tenders should be published in apparent way according to the related appropriate procedures of the interested 
Member State. 
3. Public service obligations – dilemmas 
Directives (Electricity and Gas) declare that respect for the public service requirements is a fundamental re-
quirement.16 PSOs are regarded thus, as necessity and their achievement cannot be left to the operation of the mar-
ket itself. Such PSO requirements may be interpreted by the Member States taking into account national circum-
stances. This raises fear that countries dominated by vertically integrated undertakings, might rely on PSOs to limit 
the competition or slow down market opening. For instance gas system operators may refuse access to the system, 
if the access would prevent them from carrying out public service obligations or it would be dangerous to security 
of supply. 
Furthermore some of the Member States argue that liberalization of the sector together with increased competi-
tion leads to cost cutting and consequently to a reduction in public service standards. Although this view is 
abounded in France where lawyers and interested parties argue opposite, that a reformed and reinforced public ser-
vice obligations were the main factor to ensure further liberalization in the energy sector in France.17 Moreover sec-
ond set of Gas and Electricity Directives underline the improved standards of public service obligations as com-
pared to the first set. Member States are under general obligation to notify all measures taken to fulfill PSOs, in-
cluding consumer and environmental protection, to the Commission, with details of their possible effects on na-
tional and international competition.18 Member States are also required to introduce appropriate measures to protect 
final customers (e.g., protection of vulnerable customer, elderly, or unemployed) from unjustified disconnection 
and to protect final customers’ basic rights (e.g. by requiring a minimum set of conditions for sale contracts, trans-
parency of information, and a low cost and transparent dispute resolution procedure).  
Furthermore there is an element of conflict between the obligation to serve the public interest and the funda-
mental right of business freedom. Such element of conflict arises directly form the nature of those issues. Every ob-
ligation which is imposed from top, by the State on the enterprise creates restraint to competition and entrepreneur-
ship. On the other hand it is true that imposing “non – market” obligations on enterprises such as public service ob-
ligations is requirement if not derived from necessity than derived from the political status. Level of economic and 
social development, which has been achieved in the EU cause energy, especially electricity to be a public good, 
pertained to every one, without differentiation on material status. At the same time, paradoxically energy is per-
ceived as commodity in case law of the ECJ, and as such its price should be determined by the relation of supply 
and demand and not by other non-market factors. The European Court of Justice stated very early,19 much before 
proposals for Electricity and Gas Directive were discussed, that the energy products including electricity and gas 
were commodities that are subject to the rules of the EC Treaty on the free movement of goods and services as set 
out in Articles 28 – 31 of the EC Treaty. Later on when the outlines of the Directives were known the Court con-
firmed its opinion.20 Therefore having goods which on one side are to be accessible for every one and on the other 
their price is or should be set by the market forces of demand and supply introduce vagueness to the theme.  
Moving forward PSO’s have to respect the Community framework and cannot be used to favor say one elec-
                                               
12 Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on the Internal Market in Electricity and Natural Gas. Public Ser-
vice Obligations, 16.01.2004. Among other things the Note deals with the important issue of compensation for the costs relating to carrying out 
PSO’s. 
13 Commission Green Paper of 21 May 2003 on services of general interest COM(2003) 270 final - Official Journal C 76 of 25.03.2004 
.Available also at: http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/com/gpr/2003/com2003_0270en01.pdf   
14 Commission White Paper on services of general interest COM(2004) 374 final. Available also at: 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/wpr/2004/com2004_0374en01.pdf  
15 DG TREN Interpretation Note on Public Service Obligations, p.5. 
16 E-Directive, Recital 26; G-Directive, Recital 27 
17 Lauriol T. (2005) National Approaches to implementation – France, in Cameron P. (ed) Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation. Implement-
ing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas Across Europe. Oxford University Press p.123-143. 
18 E-Directive, Art. 3(9) and G-Directive 3(6) 
19 Case C-7/68, Commission v. Italy [1968] ECR I-633, 642. 
20 See Case C-393/92 Almelo v Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij [1994] ECR I-1477 (para 28), see also Case C-158/94 Commission v Italian Republic 
[1997] ECR I-5789 
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tricity producer over another or to hinder competition on the common market. Such activities are, though, possible 
especially given the lack of clarity between the public service obligation concept, the competition rules and Article 
86 of the EC Treaty. Moreover after consulting Article 86 one might get the impression that it is possible for Article 
86 to constitute an incentive for undertakings to accept public service obligations in order to obtain an exemption 
from the application of the competition rules under provisions of paragraph 2 of the same Article. Article 86(2) 
states: Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character 
of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on 
competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the 
particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be 
contrary to the interests of the Community. However providers of public service obligations/service of general eco-
nomic interest may be exempted from application of the Treaty rules only to the extent that this is strictly necessary 
to allow them to fulfill their general economic interest mission. Nevertheless in the event of conflict, the fulfillment 
of public service mission can prevail over the application of Community rules including internal market rules, what 
on the other hand might be used to indirectly influence competition especially in markets dominated by vertically 
integrated undertakings. Therefore provisions of Article 86 are indeed an area of some sensitivity in relation to the 
PSO’s and the Internal Energy Market since it raises the prospect of avoidance of market – opening on the ground 
that this is necessary for instance to protect security of supply or environment. Moreover such exemptions are 
source of constraint either actual or potential on actions to promote competition in the energy markets in the EU, 
therefore vulnerable to scrutiny under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.21  
4. Financing of the PSO and the issue of State aids  
The question of compensation/financing of the PSO’s either in the form of State aid or exclusive rights is a 
matter which concerns all liberalised sectors (or being in the process) in the European Union (post, telecommunica-
tion, gas, electricity, air transport, etc.). Although Electricity Directive in Article 3 (4) stipulates that (…) when fi-
nancial compensation, other forms of compensation and exclusive rights which a Member State grants for the ful-
filment of the obligations set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 are provided, this shall be done in a non-discriminatory 
and transparent way(…), there is unfortunately lack of clarity within primary and secondary law, as to what are the 
conditions under which compensation for PSO’s would fall into category of State aid?  Of course there are number 
of general requirements articulated in articles 87 – 89 of the EC Treaty, but sector specificity makes it somehow 
vague. The reference should be therefore made to the existing case law, soft law and the Commission Decisions 
taken on this subject matter.  
According to the White Paper on Services of General Interest – COM (2004) 374 final, and the Green Paper on 
Services of General Interest – COM (2003) 270 final, the principle of the Member States autonomy to make policy 
choices as what is laid down within the scope of public services obligations applies to the financing as well. The fi-
nancing mechanisms applied by the Member States include: direct financial support through the State budget (eg. 
subsidies or tax reductions), special or exclusive rights (eg. legal monopoly), contributions by market participants 
(e.g. universal service fund), tariff averaging and solidarity based-financing (eg. social security contributions). 
However as a general rule in the electricity and gas sector Member States can actually choose which financing in-
strument to use, though the requirement is that it can not distort competition within the common market and it 
should be with respect to the benefit of taxpayers and the economy at large.22 In the network industries Member 
States prefer to finance public service obligations through creation of specific funds financed by market participants 
or direct public funding through the State budget, as they are perceived the least distorting way of funding.  
Unfortunately it has not been always clear, under what conditions compensation for PSO’s would actually con-
stitute State aid, and whether such aid could be considered compatible within the common market under Article 87 
of the EC treaty. Therefore in order to increase legal certainty and transparency in the application of State aid rules 
to PSOs within the network industries number of measures has been adopted. 
The first main step to clear out the situation was the judgement in the Altmark case.23 
(…)Where a State measures must be regarded as compensation for the services provided by the recipient un-
dertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, so that those undertakings do not enjoy a real financial 
advantage and the measure thus does not have the effect of putting them in a more favourable competitive position 
than the undertakings competing with them, such a measure is not caught by Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty(…). 
Additionally for such compensation to escape classification as State aid four conditions must be met:  
(i) There must be actual and clearly defined public service obligations. 
(…) the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge, and the obligations 
must be clearly defined (…)  
(ii) The parameters for calculating the compensation payments must have been established in advance in an 
objective and transparent manner.  
(…) the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an 
objective and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may favor the recipient un-
                                               
21 Article 81 of the EC Treaty prohibits anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices (unless they meet certain requirements) and Article 
82 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. 
22 White Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2004) 374 final p. 12. 
23 Case C – 280/00, Judgment of 24 July 2003, available also at:  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000J0280:EN:HTML  
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dertaking over competing undertakings. (…) Payment by a Member State of compensation for the loss incurred by 
an undertaking without the parameters of such compensation having been established beforehand, where it turns 
out after the event that the operation of certain services in connection with the discharge of public service obliga-
tions was not economically viable, therefore constitutes a financial measure which falls within the concept of State 
aid and within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty (…) 
(iii) Compensation payments must not exceed the net total costs (including return on capital etc.) caused by the 
public service obligations.  
(…) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the dis-
charge of public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit (…) 
(iv) The beneficiary is chosen in a public tender or compensation must have been set on the basis of a cost 
analysis for a hypothetical well-run undertaking equipped with the means to provide the public service.  
(…) where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations, in a specific case, is not chosen 
pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tender capable of providing 
those services at the least cost to the Community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis 
of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport 
so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obli-
gations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations (…) 
The first three conditions are fairly unproblematic. It is more questionable whether a hypothetical test, as intro-
duced in the forth condition, is suitable in all situations of public service financing, because of the special character-
istics of PSO’s. Nevertheless if these four conditions are met, public service compensation does not constitute State 
aid, and Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty do not apply. On this basis, compensation for public service provision 
doesn’t have to by notify to the European Commission.24 However if the Member States do not respect at least one 
of these conditions than the payment or other benefit granted out of State resources become State aid for the pur-
poses of Article 87(1)25 and subject to the other provisions of Article 87 and as such it is prohibited unless it is per-
mitted by Article 87(2)26 or a specific regulation; justified under Article 86 or cleared under Article 87(3)27 of the 
EC Treaty.  
In general Altmark conditions or the ECJ judgement in the Altmark case is seen as a positive step towards en-
suring required legal clarity on financing PSO’s. However they may also generate unnecessary administrative con-
straints for the small scale funding. Therefore to diminish negative consequences several additional measures have 
been proposed by the European Commission, that is: Commission Decision on the application of Article 86(2) of 
the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation and Community Framework for State aid in 
the form of public service compensation. Generally speaking the measures the European Commission has put in 
place are directed to the small scale funding. They actually seek to exempt public authorities that wish to compen-
sate mostly locally active undertakings from the obligation of prior notification. 
Commission Decision28 specifies the conditions under which compensation to companies for the provision of 
public services is compatible with the State aid rules and does not have to be notified to the European Commission 
in advance. The conditions to be met are: funding proportionate to the actual costs of the services (what was under-
lined previously by the Altmark case), and certain thresholds are not exceeded. Article 5(1) of the Commission De-
cision states: The amount of compensation shall not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs incurred in dis-
charging the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit on any 
own capital necessary for discharging those obligations. The compensation must be actually used for the operation 
of the service of general economic interest concerned, without prejudice to the undertaking’s ability to enjoy a rea-
sonable profit”. Further on in the second clause, Article 5 deals with the issue of “reasonable profit” and with all 
benefits granted by the State which amount to compensation. The amount of compensation shall include all the ad-
vantages granted by the State or through State resources in any form whatsoever. The reasonable profit shall take 
account of all or some of the productivity gains achieved by the undertakings concerned during an agreed limited 
                                               
24 All forms of compensation which remain State aid are subject to the rule of prior notification to the European Commission. 
25 Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty states: Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources 
in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market. 
26Article 87(2) of the EC Treaty states: The following shall be compatible with the common market: (a) aid having a social character, granted to 
individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; (b) aid to make 
good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; (c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic 
of Germany affected by the division of Germany, insofar as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused 
by that division. 
27Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty stipulates: The following may be considered to be compatible with the common market: a) aid to promote the 
economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; (b) aid to promote 
the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; (c) aid 
to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading condi-
tions to an extent contrary to the common interest; (d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading 
conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest; (e) such other categories of aid as may be 
specified by decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. 
28 The Commission Decision 2005/84 2/EC on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public service com-
pensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of service of general economic interest available also at:  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_312/l_31220051129en00670073.pdf or at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/action_plan/sgei_art86_en.pdf  
For more on this see also press release IP/05/937 of: 15/07/2005 on State aid 
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period without reducing the level of quality of these services entrusted to the undertaking by the State. 
In regard to thresholds the Decision is applicable to compensation of less than €30 million per year provided its 
beneficiaries have a turnover of less than €100 million per year. However when the compensation exceeds the 
above mentioned thresholds the European Commission proposed a Community Framework29 which specifies com-
prehensive conditions under which compensation not covered by the Decision is compatible with State aid rules. 
Otherwise as stated in the Decision such compensation will have to be notified to the European Commission due to 
the higher risk of distorting the competition on the common market. The general meaning of the Framework is that 
the compensation which goes beyond the costs of the public service obligation, or is used by companies on other 
markets open to competition, is not justified, and thus, assumed incompatible with the Treaty’s State aid rules. 
The main advantage of the abovementioned package of measures is that it reduces the administrative burden 
for small and local services. Most small-scale public services are exempt from the notification requirement, pro-
vided that the compensation for the PSO’s only covers the real costs of providing the service plus of course a rea-
sonable profit margin. 
In the meantime also an amendment to the Commission Transparency Directive30 on financial transparency has 
been introduced. The amendment is enhancing transparency of financial relations between Member States and 
public undertakings. And as such it is applicable to the financing/compensation of the PSO’s, whether in 
accordance with Altmark it is State aid or not and whatever the legal qualifications of these compensations are 
under Article 87 of the EC Treaty. In the second recital the Directive states that (…) sectors of the economy which 
were characterized in the past by the existence of monopolies have been or are being opened to competition. This 
process has highlighted the importance of ensuring that the rules on competition contained in the Treaty are fairly 
and effectively applied in these sectors, in particular that there is no abuse of a dominant position within the mean-
ing of Article 82 of the Treaty, and no State aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty unless it is compati-
ble with the common market, without prejudice to the possible application of Article 86(2) of the Treaty.   
Among other things Directive clarifies that companies receiving compensation dealing with public service 
obligations and other market actions irrelevant to PSO’s must have separate accounts for their different activities. In 
other words internal accounts of the undertakings entrusted with PSO’s must, in particular, show separately the 
costs and receipts associated with the PSO and those of other services (which they provide), as well as the 
parameters for allocating costs. Calculation of costs must be based on generally accepted cost accounting 
principles. Article 1(2) of the Transparency Directive requires Member States to ensure that the financial and or-
ganisational structure of any undertaking ... is correctly reflected in the separate accounts, so that the following 
emerge clearly: a) the costs and revenues associated with different activities; b) full details of the methods by which 
costs and revenues are assigned or allocated to different activities.31 
The abovementioned provision of the Transparency Directive simply serve as a guideline for undertakings in 
the gas and electricity sector with regard to drawing up and keeping separate accounts for the public service obliga-
tions. 
To sum up there is no one clear definition of the public services obligations. In line with the subsidiarity prin-
ciple, it is for Member States to define the PSOs. Although the present package of case law and soft law instru-
ments require that the scope of public service obligations is clear and transparent, so that it is possible to assess 
whether the compensation paid is in accordance with defined State aid rules or not. Nevertheless the matter of com-
pensation is fairly complex, thus some further dilemmas are unavoidable. Additionally apart of coming back ques-
tions as to financing, PSOs have many positive features especially for the consumers. But also with the instrument 
such as PSO it is possible for the authorities to exercise potentially large measures of control over the natural mo-
nopoly elements of an energy industry – irrespective of the form and pattern of ownership that is chosen. 
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Реутов В.Е. 
РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЯ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОГО КАПИТАЛА В 
ЭКОНОМИКЕ УКРАИНЫ 
 
1. Вступление. Современный этап развития в корне изменил представления о главных факторах конкуренто-
способности региональной экономики, о соотношении разных факторов развития регионов и стран, роли и месте 
человека в цивилизационном прогрессе. Опыт регионального развития ведущих стран и стран, совершивших эко-
номический рывок (в разные периоды ХХ века — Япония, Корея, Германия, Ирландия, Чехия, Венгрия, Словения), 
свидетельствует о решающем значении именно человеческого капитала, качества рабочей силы и мотивации эф-
фективного труда. Эта новая концепция заменила устаревшую, движущей силой в которой признавалось накопле-
ние материальных богатства. Соответственно, изменились и критерии конкурентоспособности регионов. От цено-
вого критерия передовые страны мира перешли к критерию качества, и именно качество (товаров, услуг, ресурсов) 
стало определять успешность регионального развития. 
К сожалению, Украина придерживается абсолютно другой экономической доктрины, которая опирается на 
принципы не высокого качества, а низкой стоимости, дешевизны (сырья, товаров, технологий, рабочей силы). Та-
кой подход может приносить успехи, но он характерен не для европейских, а для азиатских стран (Индия, Китай). 
Следствием его реализации является формирование социальной структуры, в корне отличающейся от европейской: 
вместо доминирования среднего класса и весьма умеренного уровня расслоения - поляризованное общество с вы-
сокой долей бедного населения в отдельных регионах страны.  
2. Постановка проблемы. Региональные аспекты использования трудовых ресурсов исследовались с 
работах: Брич В.Я. [1], Дзюбы С.Г. [2], Долишного М.И. [3], Злупко С.М. [3], Бандура С.И. [3], Петровой И.Л. [4], Пи-
тюлич М.И. [5], Бибен М.И. [4], Микловды В.В. [5] и др. Однако проблемы формирования экономического меха-
низма эффективного использования трудового потенциала регионов Украины не решены и часто рассмат-
риваются отдельно от общих тенденций развития региональных экономик.  
Цель статьи – выявить региональные особенности и проблемы эффективного использования рабочей 
силы в Украине. В соответствии с поставленной целью необходимо решение следующих задач: установить 
предпосылки формирования существующей системы оплаты труда, оценить уровень соответствия произво-
дительности и оплаты труда, установить масштабы региональной дифференциации уровней жизни и опла-
ты труда в Украине, вычленить основные преграды эффективному использованию человеческого капитала 
и предложить направления оптимизации  государственной политики в сфере оплаты и стимулирования тру-
да. 
Решение данных проблем находится в контексте научно-исследовательской работы Крымского эконо-
мического института Киевского национального экономического университета имени Вадима Гетьмана по 
проблеме "Реализация потенциала социально-экономического развития регионов Украины в условиях 
трансформации экономико-правовых механизмов хозяйствования" (государственный номер регистрации 
0107U003053). 
3. Результаты исследования. Декларируемое Украиной и её регионами стремление к европейской ин-
теграции должно иметь целью и формирование европейского образа жизни, и переход на соответствующую 
модель развития. К этому же побуждает и распространение европейских стандартов жизни, неминуемое 
при интенсивных поездках украинцев за границу. На практике это означает стремление большинства наших 
граждан иметь европейское жилье, питаться, одеваться и отдыхать как средний европеец. Для этого необ-
ходимы соответствующие доходы, поэтому именно уровень оплаты труда стал основным критерием выбора 
рабочего места. В частности, по данным Института социальных исследований, так считают 95% жителей 
Украины. 
Безусловно, низкая заработная плата - не следствие только государственной политики независимой Украины. 
В значительной мере низкие стандарты оплаты труда унаследованы от административно-командной экономиче-
